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CITIES, PROPERTY, AND POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
GIDEON PARCHOMOVSKY* & PETER SIEGELMAN**
ABSTRACT
Cities are the locales of numerous interactions that generate
externalities—both negative and positive. Although the common law
provides a vast array of mechanisms for limiting negative externali-
ties, there is a striking absence of provisions for stimulating the
production of positive ones. As a consequence, activities whose social
benefits are greater than their private costs are not undertaken, with
a resulting efficiency loss.
In this Article, we demonstrate how cities can develop commercial
districts that allow for the capture of positive externalities by fol-
lowing the example of suburban malls. In malls, anchor stores pro-
vide positive externalities—additional customers—to neighboring
stores. Anchors capture these externalities through the subsidized
rents they pay to mall owners, who in turn charge higher rents to the
smaller businesses who benefit from the additional traffic. This
private law mechanism provides a strong reason for large stores to
locate in suburban malls—where they can recoup some or all of the
spillover benefits they provide—as opposed to urban centers, where
they are unable to recover the benefits they provide to neighboring
stores.
Businesses in cities may generate similar positive externalities, but
the law offers virtually no mechanisms by which they can recover any
of the value of the benefits they provide. We argue that cities should
use pubic law to create planned commercial districts, analogous to
suburban malls, which would allow for the capture of positive
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externalities among commercial establishments. We also discuss how
cities can use the legal powers at their disposal to achieve this goal.
We submit that the reconfiguration of downtown areas will not only
result in the production of new positive externalities but will also
reduce the negative externalities associated with urban sprawl.
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INTRODUCTION
Viewed from an economic perspective, cities are all about positive1
and negative externalities.2 Cities that minimize the scope and
magnitude of negative externalities and are able to produce positive
externalities will have an inherent edge over localities that fail at
these twin tasks.3 From a legal standpoint, therefore, successful
urban planning requires cities to adopt legal policies that minimize
harmful third-party effects—that is, negative externalities, and
encourage uses with salutary spillovers—that is, positive externali-
ties. Both types of externalities are of great significance to the eco-
nomic performance of cities. Yet, the two types have been treated
very differently by scholars and lawmakers.4 
With a few notable exceptions, property and land use laws are
largely concerned with the problem of negative externalities—acts
that impose unaccounted-for costs on others. Ownership structures,
as well as the laws of nuisance, servitudes, and zoning, are com-
monly understood as means for internalizing negative externalities,5
which have also been a focal point in property and tort theory. 
1. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 199 (6th ed. 2012) (defining
positive externalities as arising from activities that yield benefits to parties who do not pay
to receive them); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1127-28
(1992); see also Richard Florida, Cities, Bikes, Diabetes, Flu Shots and Positive Externalities,
CREATIVE CLASS (Nov. 14, 2007, 9:33 PM), http://www.creativeclass.com/_v3/creative_
class/2007/11/14/cities-bikes-diabetes-flu-shots-and-positive-externalities/ (“Cities are vast
reservoirs of positive externalities in employment, transportation, education, recreation and
services. People migrate to cities hoping for all those happy spillovers to land on them.”).
2. See MANKIW, supra note 1, at 196 (defining a negative externality as arising from an
actor’s behavior that imposes a cost on someone else, for which the actor does not pay). 
3. As David Schleicher put it, “[c]ities develop because they provide these ‘agglomeration’
gains, that is, they provide residents with the advantages of big, diverse, and productive
markets and creative ferment. Because of this, cities will draw residents and businesses even
if all local governments provide identical local policies.” David Schleicher, The City as a Law
and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1510 (2010).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See, e.g., Dean Lueck, Co-Dir., Program on Econ., Law & the Env’t, Univ. of Ariz.,
Lecture at the European School on New Institutional Economics: Economics of Property Law
(May 18, 2011), available at http://esnie.org/pdf/textes_2011/Lueck.pdf (observing that
property rights give rise to a myriad of externalities and explaining that property law
addresses externalities through the doctrines of trespass, nuisance, and servitudes, and
through regulatory zoning). 
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All the while, however, scholars have paid scant attention to the
mirror-image phenomenon of positive externalities—acts that confer
unaccounted-for benefits on others. Property theorists have long
recognized the existence of positive externalities, but the literature
has largely ignored them.6 Even worse, in the few cases in which
urban planners have touted positive spillovers from various devel-
opment projects such as sports stadiums, these promised benefits
have typically failed to materialize.7 
In this Article, we propose a legal policy that would enable cities
to better manage positive externalities, increasing their odds of
success. One aspect of urban life that is rife with positive externali-
ties is commerce.8 Not all businesses are created equal, however.
Famous brand name stores and large commercial establishments
create a plethora of positive externalities for their smaller neigh-
bors.9 To illustrate, consider the effect of a downtown Apple store on
neighboring business. Many of the customers attracted by the Apple
store are likely to purchase a coffee at a neighboring café or a meal
at a nearby restaurant. Some may even use this opportunity to shop
for clothes or furniture. Importantly, there is no reciprocity in the
relationship: most smaller businesses simply do not have the grav-
itational pull to attract masses of customers independently, and
6. See infra Part I.A. One significant exception is Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A.
Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 257-58 (2007), which offers a theory of why
uncompensated positive externalities, or spillovers, are sometimes desirable, especially in the
context of intellectual property, where spillovers may lead to further innovation. Another is
Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147 (2006). Hershovitz’s
argument is that if the basis of tort law is really to promote efficiency, the law should be as
concerned with rewarding positive externalities as it is with punishing negative ones. Id. at
1186-88. We take no position in this philosophical dispute between correct justice and
efficiency theories, but we do present an example where the failure to account for positive
externalities has significant efficiency consequences.
7. See Robert A. Baade & Richard F. Dye, The Impact of Stadium and Professional Sports
on Metropolitan Area Development, GROWTH & CHANGE, Apr. 1990, at 1 (analyzing stadium
investment and questioning its positive economic impact); Dennis Coates & Brad R.
Humphreys, Professional Sports Facilities, Franchises and Urban Economic Development, 3
PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 335, 335 (2003) (“[E]conomists have found no evidence of positive economic
impact of professional sports teams and facilities on urban economies.”).
8. See Schleicher, supra note 3, at 1509-10 (explaining that by selecting the right
location, a business can “capture information spillovers, and participate in larger and more
specialized labor and consumption markets”).
9. See infra Part II.B.
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thus do not bestow a similar benefit on brand name stores.10 The
positive effect of larger businesses on smaller ones can best be seen
when an anchor business shuts down or relocates to another area.
Closings or relocations of anchor stores are often the kiss of death
to many small businesses and may portend the economic decline of
entire downtown areas.11 The opposite is also true: the arrival of an
anchor store may revive a commercial district, and a critical mass
of branded stores can do much to secure the viability of a downtown
area.12 
Cities’ failure to take account of the positive externalities
generated by anchor stores may have played an important part in
the much-lamented hollowing-out of central city business districts
and the flight by retail commerce, and its customers, to the sub-
urbs.13 Because—as we demonstrate below—large retail stores are
able to capture the positive spillovers they generate when they
locate in malls, but not when they locate in central cities, suburban
malls have a built-in competitive advantage over urban centers
when it comes to attracting such enterprises.14
Cities can attract branded stores in many ways. One obvious way
is to subsidize them. We believe, however, that the subsidy solution
is misguided. Subsidies impose a cost on the public and raise the
specter of political corruption.15 Instead, we suggest that local
planners should adopt policies that can unlock the value inherent
in positive externalities by attracting businesses and establishments
that create positive spillovers for neighboring businesses, and by
allowing the former to internalize those benefits.16 
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See Interview by Jacky Lyden with Chris Leinberger, Professor of Practice in Urban
and Reg’l Planning, Univ. of Mich. Taubman Coll. of Architecture & Urban Planning, on NPR
(Aug. 20, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/08/20/139815836/without-an-anchor-
store-does-a-neighborhood-float-away; see also MICHAEL D. BEYARD ET AL., URBAN LAND INST.,
TEN PRINCIPLES FOR REBUILDING NEIGHBORHOOD RETAIL, at iv (2003), available at
http://www.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/ULI-Documents/TP_NeighborhoodRetail.ashx_.pdf.
12. See BEYARD ET AL., supra note 11, at 6-7.
13. See id. at iv.
14. Compare infra Part II.B (noting techniques used by malls to capture anchor stores’
positive spillovers), with infra Part III (outlining the challenges cities face in taking
advantage of anchor stores).
15. See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part III.
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To get a handle on how to achieve this result, it is useful to think
about the problem from the perspective of a single owner. In his
seminal article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, Harold
Demsetz demonstrated that it is possible to internalize the exter-
nalities resulting from the usage of land by consolidating all the
rights in the hands of a single owner.17 Adopting the Demsetzian
perspective, we imagine a world in which a single entity owns all
commercial properties and ask how she would manage the proper-
ties to take account of the spillover benefits that large stores create
for smaller ones. In fact, this problem is less hypothetical than it
may appear at first glance: owners of private shopping malls
encounter this problem on a regular basis and have come up with an
effective solution: differential rents.18 
Most people know that a key to the success of many shopping
malls is the inclusion of one or more major anchor stores that have
an independent ability to draw clientele.19 What is less well known
is that such anchors pay a highly reduced rent relative to other
stores.20 Empirical studies establish that anchor stores average 14
percent of the rent per square foot charged to smaller retailers, and
in some cases pay no rent at all.21 The lower rent reflects the bene-
ficial effect such stores generate for neighboring smaller retailers
via the additional customers that the anchor stores bring to their
smaller cotenants.22 The differential rent collected by mall owners
is effectively an internalization mechanism that takes account of
the relative contributions of store owners to each other’s business.
Indeed, one of the important functions of mall management is to
design and implement an appropriate pricing scheme that allows
the anchor stores to capture a significant share of the spillover
benefits they create.23 
We show that a variant of this scheme can be used to help revive
urban commercial districts. To implement it, cities should take two
17. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 355-56
(1967).
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra Table 1.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part II.B.
218 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:211
steps. First, they should use their planning and zoning powers to
designate optimal locations for commercial districts.24 Once this task
has been accomplished, cities should use their eminent domain
power to consolidate all the rights in the relevant lots.25 At the end
of this process, all lots will be under single ownership—that of the
city. At this point, a city faces a choice of developing the shopping
district by itself, or of auctioning it off to mall developers. We
discuss the pluses and minuses of each approach.26
Implementation of our scheme may not only revive commercial
areas in cities and guarantee their economic sustainability, but will
also have an underappreciated yet highly desirable effect: it will
tend to reduce the negative externalities stemming from urban
sprawl.27 Surprisingly, the internalization of positive externalities
in commercial districts would simultaneously result in the reduction
of many negative third-party effects and a substantial enhancement
of overall efficiency.28 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we
discuss the theoretical literature on externalities and its influences
on legal doctrines. We show that whereas concern with negative
externalities has shaped multiple doctrines in various legal areas,
positive externalities have received almost no attention from law-
makers and legal scholars. Notwithstanding the lopsided treatment
of negative and positive externalities in the theoretical literature
and in practice—or perhaps because of it—we conclude that the
internalization of positive externalities is a laudable goal for legal
policy if it can be attained at a reasonable cost. The discussion in
Part II builds on the theoretical exploration in Part I by extending
and applying the theory in the contexts of urban development and
24. See infra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See, e.g., MATTHEW E. KAHN, GREEN CITIES: URBAN GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
3, 98 (2006) (arguing that increasing density via urbanism is a way to avoid the conflict
between growth in output and environmental degradation); Ryan Avent, One Path to Better
Jobs: More Density in Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/
opinion/sunday/one-path-to-better-jobs-more-density-in-cities.html?pagewanted=all
(summarizing theoretical arguments and empirical evidence showing that concentrating
economic activity in cities creates more jobs and leads to technological dynamism because of
spillover effects—positive externalities).
28. See Avent, supra note 27.
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shopping mall configuration. By juxtaposing the two contexts, we
draw potential recommendations for redesigning downtown com-
mercial districts. In Part III, we advance a blueprint for implement-
ing our proposal and address possible challenges and objections.
Finally, in Part IV, we assess the broader economic benefits to cities
from adopting our proposal.
I. EXTERNALITIES AND THE LAW
In this Part, we introduce the concepts of negative and positive
externalities and discuss their treatment in economics and law.
As we show, concern about negative externalities has played a key
role in the development of property, as well as tort doctrine.
Surprisingly, the twin concept of positive externalities has been
shunted to the side by theorists and virtually ignored by common
law courts. Under common law rules, actors who create positive
externalities for others have only very limited scope to recover for
any of the benefits they have conferred.29 
In an attempt to address this anomaly, we discuss the limited
scholarly justifications for ignoring positive externalities. We find
fault with most of these justifications, but even if efficiency-minded
common law courts would do best to ignore positive externalities,
this in no way means that such spillovers should be ignored
altogether. Indeed, much of urban development policy can be char-
acterized as attempts—often misguided—to create or foster positive
externalities via the exercise of regulatory authority. For example,
city governments often agree to subsidize the building of stadiums
for sports teams in the unwarranted hope that doing so will create
spillover benefits for the community at large that the team or
stadium owner cannot recover on their own.30 In fact, it seems likely
29. See infra Part I.A.
30. See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs, Taxes: Are New Stadiums Worth
the Cost?, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1997, at 36 (“[W]e ... examine the local economic
development argument from all angles: case studies of the effect of specific facilities, as well
as comparisons among cities and even neighborhoods that have and have not sunk hundreds
of millions of dollars into sports development. In every case, the conclusions are the same. A
new sports facility has an extremely small (perhaps even negative) effect on overall economic
activity and employment. No recent facility appears to have earned anything approaching a
reasonable return on investment.... Regardless of ... the unit of analysis[,] ... the economic
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that the common law’s failure to recognize positive externalities has
led urban planners to emphasize them in attempts to regulate
development. 
We conclude that the presence of positive externalities—when
they are correctly identified, rather than merely hypothesized to
exist—constitutes a legitimate basis for policy. Regulations should
strive to internalize both negative and positive externalities when
there is a cost-effective way to do so. We suggest that such a mech-
anism does indeed exist in the case of shopping malls, which are
designed so as to capture the positive externalities created by
anchor stores on other nearby stores.
A. Of Negative and Positive Externalities
As any law student knows, externalities come in two forms:
negative and positive. A negative externality refers to the adverse
effect of one’s activity on others that is not reflected in market
prices.31 Accordingly, if Amy operates a cement factory next to
Beth’s home, the smoke, noise, and soot emanating from the factory
constitute negative externalities imposed on Beth.32 Positive exter-
nalities are the uncompensated beneficial effects of one’s activities
enjoyed by third parties.33 Hence, if Carol tends a beautiful, un-
fenced garden that Deborah passes every day on her way to work,
Deborah enjoys a benefit from Carol’s action, for which Deborah
need not pay.
Although negative and positive externalities may be thought of as
two sides of the same coin, or two manifestations of the same
problem, the former has received endless attention, whereas the
latter has largely remained an academic curiosity. It is no exaggera-
tion to say that negative externalities were the key impetus for the
benefits of sports facilities are de minimus.”).
31. See supra note 2.
32. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (conditioning an
injunction on the nonpayment of permanent damages); see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115-16 (1972) (stating that internalizing externalities created by
pollution is a frequent goal of nuisance law). 
33. See supra note 1.
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development of the law and economics movement,34 and they are
frequently invoked as the justification for much of our property, tort,
and regulatory law.35 One can easily trace the impact of negative
externalities on both law and economics, and legal doctrine by
focusing on a single problem: pollution. 
The first theorist to address the problem of pollution was the
British economist Arthur Pigou.36 Perturbed by the fact that facto-
ries could pollute with impunity, Pigou proposed imposing a tax on
polluters in order to force them to take account of the harm they
inflicted on the rest of society. The amount of the tax was to be
equal to the harm society suffered as a result of the pollution.37 This
mechanism, which later became known as a “Pigouvian tax,” was
the first attempt to internalize the harms of pollution, and thereby
to align the narrow economic self-interest of polluters with the
broader societal interest.38 As should be apparent, Pigou’s solution
was regulatory in nature. 
The next attempt to tackle the pollution problem was also the
definitive moment in modern law and economics. In his seminal
work, The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase demonstrated that
when transaction costs are sufficiently low—nonexistent in his
original analysis—private bargaining will solve the problem of
negative externalities.39 Revisiting the problem of pollution, Coase
showed that in a world with no transaction costs and perfect
information, bargaining between the parties would lead to one of
two outcomes. Either the polluter would compensate the victim—if
the benefit the polluter derived from the underlying activity
34. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-16 (1960) (examining
legal frameworks and concluding that in the absence of transaction costs, each is equally
efficient at internalizing externalities). 
35. See infra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., E.C. Pasour, Jr., Pigou, Coase, Common Law, and Environmental Policy:
Implications of the Calculation Debate, 87 PUB. CHOICE 243, 243 (1996) (“The modern theory
of neighborhood effects is rooted in A.C. Pigou’s Economics of Welfare.”). 
37. More precisely, efficiency requires that the marginal tax rate be set equal to the
marginal social harm. See, e.g., id. at 244-45 (“A per-unit tax (T) levied on the [polluter] equal
to the difference between marginal private cost and marginal social cost will internalize the
externality.”).
38. See id. at 248.
39. See Coase, supra note 34, at 9-11 (explaining that in a transaction cost-free world, the
allocation of legal liability will not affect the final allocation of resources because of private
bargaining).
222 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:211
exceeded the harm to the victim—or abate the pollution, in the
extreme case, by shutting down her plant—if the harm to the victim
exceeded the benefits to the polluter from continuing operation.40 In
either case, the efficient solution would be reached. And, astonish-
ingly, the efficient result would be obtained regardless of whether
the factory held the legal entitlement to pollute or the victim had
the legal entitlement to be free from pollution.41 Coase, therefore,
proposed a contractual solution to the problem of negative externali-
ties.
Harold Demsetz, who espoused a property-centered perspective,
advanced a different approach to the problem of negative externali-
ties. Demsetz’s Toward a Theory of Property deviated from prior
contributions in another sense: it did not focus on pollution per se
but rather on the exploitation of natural resources.42 Demsetz
observed that open access and common property regimes invariably
generate negative externalities in asset use. In both regime types,
actors receive the full marginal benefit of their use of common
resources but incur only a fraction of the marginal cost represented
by the small diminution in their future consumption opportunities,
with the lion’s share of the cost distributed over all the other owners
or group members.43 Accordingly, Demsetz predicted that resources
held in common will be over-exploited44—a phenomenon that was
subsequently dubbed the “tragedy of the commons” by Garrett
Hardin.45 
Importantly, Demsetz did not just settle for pointing out the
problem; he also proposed a solution. He noted that the externality
problem can be solved by consolidating all relevant rights in
resources in the hands of a single private owner. Once an asset is
40. See id. at 11.
41. See id.
42. See Demsetz, supra note 17, at 356 (“The resulting private ownership of land will
internalize many of the external costs associated with communal ownership .... This
concentration of benefits and costs on owners creates incentives to utilize resources more
efficiently.”).
43. See id. at 354-55, 358-59.
44. Id. at 354-55.
45. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968). 
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owned by a single owner, most consumption externalities dis-
appear.46 
It is precisely for this reason that actors litter in public streets,
but hardly ever in the privacy of their homes. When an individual
disposes of her cigarette in a public street, she gets the full, albeit
small, benefit of her act, whereas the larger cost is spread out over
the entire population. If she were to do so in her own home, she
would get the same benefit, but since she herself would have to
clean it up eventually, she would also pay the full cost of doing so.
When the same individual both receives the benefit and has to pay
the full costs of an act, the individual will refrain from acts such as
littering that generate low benefits and high costs. The concentra-
tion of all rights in the hands of a single individual greatly reduces
the owner’s ability to pass the costs of her behavior with respect to
the asset onto third parties.47 
The impact of negative externalities on our tort law is even
greater than their effect on property theory. Indeed, concern about
negative externalities lies at the heart of the law of negligence, the
centerpiece of our tort system. Negligence law is aimed at encourag-
ing actors to take the costs they impose on others into account by
entitling harmed parties to seek redress against tortfeasors.48
Accordingly, if Eric drives negligently in a school zone and hits Fay,
he will have to compensate Fay for the harm she suffered. Of course,
the duty to compensate may be justified on corrective justice
grounds,49 but it also forces actors to consider the effect of their
actions on third parties. Realizing this, actors will deviate from the
socially acceptable standard of behavior only if the benefit they
derive from such deviation exceeds the expected harm they may
cause to third parties.50 
In the case of accidents—and more generally, most instances that
come under the law of negligence—transaction costs are typically
46. Demsetz, supra note 17, at 356-57.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120, 121
(1982).
49. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449,
513 (1992).
50. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 1823, 1833 (2009).
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high.51 Consequently, Coase’s model of internalization-by-contract
is not an ideal solution. A pedestrian cannot be expected to contract
with all potential drivers who pose a threat to her. Nor is it practical
to achieve internalization using Demsetz’s single owner standard.
Surely, a driver cares about damage to her automobile. But absent
a duty to compensate, she may not pay sufficiently careful heed to
the potential harm her driving poses to pedestrians and other third
parties. The duty to compensate ameliorates drivers’ incentives to
focus narrowly on their own self-interest.52
Conversion is another example of a tort that is concerned with
negative externalities.53 In a world without conversion, people would
help themselves to others’ assets whenever they derived some
positive value from doing so. For example, Jill would appropriate
Harry’s laptop, even if she only needed it to update her Facebook
page. The tort of conversion causes potential takers of private
property to think not only about the benefits they can derive from
an asset, but also about the cost the owner would suffer as a result
of the deprivation. 
Turning to property law, we can see many of the same design
features. Property rights are rights in rem, meaning that they pre-
vail against “the rest of the world.”54 This is significant because
many assets provide abundant consumption externalities for third
parties. Consider an unfenced apple orchard situated next to a high
school. As in the context of torts, the cost of establishing contractual
arrangements with respect to property is prohibitive in the real
51. Cf. Demsetz, supra note 17, at 356 (making the same argument in a communal
property context).
52. Notice we use the term “ameliorate” and not “eliminate.” This is because driving gives
rise to a host of other externalities, foremost among which are pollution, congestion, and other
environmental effects. Indeed, many economists attribute the excessively high number of
large sports utility vehicles on American roads to the fact that neither the legal system nor
any extralegal mechanism achieves full internalization in this context. See, e.g., William S.
Vickrey, Congestion Theory and Transport Investment, AM. ECON. REV., May 1969, at 251,
251; Michelle J. White, The “Arms Race” on American Roads: The Effect of Sport Utility
Vehicles and Pickup Trucks on Traffic Safety, 47 J.L. & ECON. 333, 334-36 (2004); Michael
Anderson & Maximilian Auffhammer, Pounds That Kill: The External Costs of Vehicle Weight
3-4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17170, 2011).
53. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 49, at 457-58 (noting that the “nonconsensual transfer of
possession” gives rise to the tort of conversion, and the justification “seems clear enough”).
54. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 777 (2001).
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world—the owner cannot be expected to negotiate a price with each
student who might want to take an apple. 
But what about Demsetz’s single owner principle? Many assets,
although not all of them, are indeed owned by a single owner.
However, the formalization of a single owner only takes care of
intra-asset externalities that arise when an asset has multiple
owners.55 Unfortunately, the single owner principle does nothing to
ameliorate interasset externalities, namely those that are imposed
on other asset owners by one’s use of one’s own asset. To illustrate,
consider an owner who loves hosting loud parties every weekend.
The parties delight the particular owner. In fact, in terms of her
personal preferences, she sees no downside to hosting them. Her
neighbors, who have different preferences, may see the situation
rather differently. 
Hence, property law contains various doctrines that diminish the
exposure of property owners to negative externalities.56 Think first
about the doctrines of trespass and nuisance.57 Both doctrines apply
to noncontractual interactions involving property owners and third
parties. Nuisance law is crafted to prevent property owners from
using their land in ways that cause unreasonable interference to
neighboring property owners.58 Without nuisance law, property
55. See Demsetz, supra note 17, at 355 (describing the single property owner’s sole focus
on the particularly owned property in light of future individuals’ prospective ownership of the
same).
56. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1333 (1993)
(“External institutions designed to deter negative spillover effects of land activities include,
for example, norms of neighborliness, common-law nuisance rules, and government land-use
regulations.”); Yonatan Even, Appropriability and Property, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1417, 1424 n.10
(2009) (“Some negative externalities—most notably, those that have an adverse effect on
neighboring privately held property—are dealt with by tort law doctrines such as trespass and
nuisance. Others—especially those that affect resources that are held in common—are dealt
with through governmental regulation in the form of environmental laws, zoning laws, etc.”);
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 47
(1994) (reporting that zoning advocates maintain that “zoning serves principally to protect
property owners from the negative externalities of new developments”).
57. Indeed, as Thomas Miceli suggests, the laws of trespass and nuisance are “[t]he
principal common law remedies for externalities.” See Thomas J. Miceli, Property, in THE
ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 246, 250 (Jürgen G. Backhaus ed., 2d ed. 2005).
58. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979) (“One is subject to liability for
a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either (a) intentional
and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling
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owners would be tempted to use their property in a myriad of ways
that give them pleasure, while causing suffering to their close, and
maybe not so close, neighbors. Nuisance law is a corrective mecha-
nism that forces each owner to take account of the negative effects
of her actions on other owners and engage only in those activities
that do not unduly interfere with the interests of proximate prop-
erty owners.59 
Trespass law has the same effect as nuisance law, except it
applies to owners and nonowners alike.60 Trespass law discourages
the general public from taking liberty with others’ property.61 It
discourages passersby from availing themselves of private and
public land without permission from the owner. If third parties were
at liberty to enter land whenever they wanted, they would take
advantage of this privilege without regard to the interference they
cause to the owner’s use or the psychological harm they inflict upon
her.62 
It should be borne in mind that not all property forms feature a
single owner. Much property, if not most, is owned by multiple
parties. These cases are governed by the law of cotenancies. A
cornerstone of the law of cotenancies is the duty not to commit
waste. A cotenant who commits waste—represented by actively com-
promising the asset or by allowing it to fall into disrepair—ought to
compensate the other cotenants for the loss they suffer.63 The logic
should be clear by now. Cotenancy regimes create an incentive for
the cotenant-in-possession to overuse the asset because she gets the
full marginal benefit of the use, whereas the marginal cost is spread
out among all cotenants.
Law’s campaign against negative externalities is not restricted to
private law. In fact, private law is strikingly ill-suited to deal with
liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or
activities.”).
59. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1040 (2008) (“Nuisance law is designed to deal with the
problem of externalities.”).
60. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 50, at 1828-37 (discussing both ex ante and ex
post rationalizations for trespass liability and remedy).
61. See id. at 1828-29 (“[Trespass law] empowers the owner to prevent others from using,
occupying, or taking her property.”).
62. See id. at 1834.
63. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 90 (2012).
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negative externalities that exceed a certain scale.64 Think about
industrial pollution. Our tort and property laws that rely on private
enforcement often cannot cope with the full magnitude of the
problems they confront. For example, industrial pollution often
affects multiple people in different jurisdictions and even nations.65
The massive scale of the problem creates multiple enforcement
problems.66 First, it may be costly to track the pollution to its source.
Second, there may be various problems of causation when there are
multiple polluters. Third, collective action problems may undermine
enforcement efforts; each of the victims would love to receive com-
pensation but prefers to see someone else spearhead the litigation
efforts. These challenges call for larger-scale regulatory interven-
tion, and recognizing this logic, Congress has enacted various laws
that set up special agencies to specify the permissible levels of
pollution and to enforce these restrictions. Environmental legisla-
tion, such as the Clean Air Act67 and the Clean Water Act,68 are
prime examples of this approach. But, of course, myriad other forms
64. See Ellickson, supra note 56, at 1332-35 (arguing that group ownership is best to
address issues of ownership boundaries and large-scale issues).
65. See Carl B. Meyer, The Environmental Fate of Toxic Wastes, the Certainty of Harm,
Toxic Torts, and Toxic Regulation, 19 ENVTL. L. 321, 328-30 (1988) (discussing the growth of
toxic waste’s scope).
66. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 213,
218-19 (1991) (outlining six problem “themes” associated with litigating “contemporary mass
tort complex litigation”).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2006); see also R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE
COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 25-31 (1983) (detailing the 1970 “policy
breakthrough” and the resulting Clean Air Act).
68. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). But see Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey,
Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 58-61 (1996) (discussing several methods of
internalizing costs on polluters through state and local government regulation).
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of regulation,69 ranging from antitrust,70 to criminal law,71 to
securities regulation,72 are tailored to curb self-interested behaviors
whose costs are borne, at least in part, by others. 
The contrast between the legal system’s extensive mechanisms for
dealing with negative externalities and its meager resources for
coping with positive spillovers is striking. The chief body of law that
deals with positive externalities is unjust enrichment. The law of
unjust enrichment, or restitution, is based on the principle that
individuals who receive a benefit to which they are not entitled
must return the benefit—in kind or in cash—to the benefactor.73 As
a rule, unjust enrichment entitles an aggrieved party to restitution
only in cases of ill-gotten gains, when the benefactor did not intend
to confer the benefit on the recipient.74 Examples of such uninten-
tionally conferred benefits include benefits secured through fraud,
misrepresentation, or mistake.75
In instances involving intended benefits, restitution will be
awarded only in rescue cases, when multiple parties are jointly and
severally liable under the law and one of them performs the underl-
ying obligation for which they are all responsible, or, conversely,
when a party secures through legal proceedings payment that
69. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Weighing Environmental Externalities: Let’s Do It Right!,
ELECTRICITY J., May 1992, at 53, 56-57 (discussing emissions regulation); Jules Pretty et al.,
Policy Challenges and Priorities for Internalizing the Externalities of Modern Agriculture, 44
J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 263, 270-78 (2001) (discussing agriculture regulation); Paul
Thorsnes, Internalizing Neighborhood Externalities: The Effect of Subdivision Size and Zoning
on Residential Lot Prices, 48 J. URB. ECON. 397, 399-402 (2000) (discussing land development
regulation).
70. See Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State
Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 5 (2004) (discussing the internalization of
monopoly costs imposed on society).
71. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 8-10 (discussing the internalization of the
negative externalities created by crime).
72. See George Foster, Externalities and Financial Reporting, 35 J. FIN. 521, 525-32 (1980)
(analyzing the myriad means by which financial reporting accounts for externalities).
73. See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits,
108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 190, 195, 197 (2009) (discussing unjust enrichment in positive
externality terms). Also relevant is Saul Levmore’s treatment of these issues. See generally
Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985).
74. Porat, supra note 73, at 195.
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 5, 13 (2011).
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multiple parties are entitled to share.76 In reviewing the law of
restitution, Ariel Porat refers to these cases as exceptions to the
general legal rule that unrequested benefits do not give rise to
restitution.77 
Copyright and patent law may be thought of as two other legal
areas designed to deal with positive externalities.78 Both bodies of
law entitle actors—authors in the case of copyright law and in-
ventors in the case of patent law—to collect from others the value
of the benefits the actors have bestowed upon others.79 Patent law
empowers inventors to collect the value of unrequested benefits
from follow-on innovators.80 Copyright law confers upon authors a
broad right to control adaptations of their original works.81 In effect,
the exclusivity granted to inventors and authors allows them to
demand payment from third parties who benefit from their cre-
ations, even though the recipient of the benefit did not request it.
Yet we have nothing resembling a full-blown jurisprudence of
benefits. An owner of a beautiful home cannot demand payment
from passersby for the visual enjoyment they derive. Residents who
clean and maintain a public park cannot collect the value of the
benefit they create for other users of the park. Likewise, individuals
who voluntarily provide various community services cannot collect
payment from actual or potential beneficiaries, nor are those who
instruct others how to perform certain tasks or dispense valuable
76. Porat, supra note 73, at 195-97; see also Levmore, supra note 73, at 65 (“The rule is,
of course, that ‘volunteers’ or ‘officious intermeddlers’ do not recover in restitution even if they
can prove their expenses or the value of their provisions.”).
77. Porat, supra note 73, at 195-98 (“[W]hen benefits are voluntarily conferred but not at
the recipient’s request, the law [generally] does not impose any duty of restitution on the
recipient, and she is allowed to keep the benefits at no cost to her.”).
78. Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and
the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1048 (1990) (“[C]opyright ...
serve[s] a particular incentive function: [it seeks] to ‘internalize externalities.’”); Rolf Weder
& Herbert G. Grubel, The New Growth Theory and Coasean Economics: Institutions to
Capture Externalities, 129 REV. WORLD ECON. 488, 490 (1993) (discussing the positive
knowledge spillovers created by the patent system). 
79. See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357-58 (2010)
(describing this as the “reward theory” of patent law); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for
Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1231-32 (1998) (“The benefit to the copyright
owner is thus obtained at the expense of those who would have acquired the work at the lower
price were there no copyright.”).
80. See Sichelman, supra note 79, at 357-58.
81. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.09 (2011). 
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information to third parties entitled to collect any rewards. Finally,
individuals who compliment a peer are not eligible to receive
anything from her. 
B. Theoretical Justifications and Their Limitations
In recent contributions, several leading law and economics
scholars have sought to justify the law’s disparate treatment of
negative and positive externalities. Saul Levmore, for example,
raised, and rejected, the theory that the law generally does not take
account of positive externalities on account of various valuation
difficulties.82 In a nutshell, the argument runs as follows: to award
restitution for benefits received, courts must be able to evaluate the
benefit to the recipient. Unfortunately, the value of the benefit to
the recipient is private information unobservable and unverifiable
by the courts. Levmore finds this explanation unpersuasive. He
notes that despite the evaluation difficulties, the law recognizes
restitution for benefits in some cases.83 Furthermore, if valuation
difficulties are the reason for denying restitution, then restitution
should be recognized whenever valuation does not present a serious
problem. Moreover, Levmore points out that the evaluation dif-
ficulties that attend tort disputes are no less acute, yet that did not
stop us from developing a full-fledged torts jurisprudence.84 
Ariel Porat advances a different explanation. Porat begins by
pointing out an essential asymmetry between positive and negative
externalities.85 In the case of negative externalities, tortfeasors have
no upper bound to the level of harm they can inflict on potential
victims.86 Absent laws forbidding such activities, self-interested
actors may pollute massively, drive hyper-recklessly, and create
extreme health and safety risks for others. Hence, it is essential to
82. See Levmore, supra note 73, at 69-72.
83. Id. at 71.
84. Id. at 71-72. It should be noted that Levmore discusses three additional explanations
for the law’s disparate treatment of costs and benefits. He ultimately rejects them all. See id.
at 72-82. For an excellent summary, see Hershovitz, supra note 6, at 1151-60.
85. See Porat, supra note 73, at 190.
86. See id. at 199 (“[W]ithout regulation or internalization, there would be no restriction
whatsoever on injurers’ harmful activities.... [And consequently] injurers would be completely
indifferent to causing harms; even a small expected benefit would induce them to create huge
losses for others.”). 
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impose legal limits that cap the level of injurious activities actors
can carry out. However, no similar concern exists in the case of
positive externalities.87 The worst possible outcome is simply that
an actor will choose not to make any contribution that creates
positive spillovers. In other words, Porat argues that whereas the
harm from negative externalities is potentially unbounded, the
harm from someone’s failure to undertake activities that generate
positive externalities is capped at zero.88
Porat’s explanation is powerful, and it certainly captures an
important difference between negative and positive externalities.
But, of course, the real question is whether society should encourage
individuals to undertake activities that generate positive externali-
ties, or whether it should tolerate the underprovision of such
activities. Porat admits that the absence of a duty on beneficiaries
to compensate their benefactors creates a disincentive for actors to
engage in activities that benefit others.89 More generally, the law’s
stance on positive externalities leads to underproduction of activi-
ties that benefit others. Hence, Porat calls for an “Expanded Duty
of Restitution,”90 under which, when certain conditions are met,
recipients would be legally obliged to “compensate benefactors for
unrequested benefits” in order to “promote efficiency and provide
incentives for private production of public goods.”91
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci proffers a different solution to the nega-
tive/positive externalities puzzle. Dari-Mattiacci points to several
key differences between the two types of externalities.92 First, he
distinguishes negative and positive externalities on the basis of
87. See id. (concluding, after explaining the need for legal intervention in the case of
negative externalities, that “[n]o parallel risk exists in the case of benefits” because society
has no reason to be worried about actors enhancing the level of benefit-conferring activities).
On the other hand, one might question Porat’s assertion that the maximum loss from the
failure to provide a positive benefit is zero. An opportunity cost measure would count the
nonprovision of a benefit as a loss, and this loss could be of any size. Porat correctly notes that
A’s failure to provide a benefit does not necessarily preclude B or C from doing so; but there
would seem to be many circumstances in which A is the only party likely to provide the
benefit, and if she fails to provide it, nobody else will. See, e.g., id. at 195 (discussing rescue
cases).
88. See id. at 199.
89. See id. at 191.
90. Id. at 190.
91. Id. at 190-91. 
92. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 22-26 (2009).
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intent.93 Specifically, he argues that although the law should impose
liability for both intentional and unintentional inflictions of harm,
it should concern itself with only unintentional conferral of benefit;
intentional bestowals of benefits should not give rise to restitution.94
Following the credo of law and economics, Dari-Mattiacci accepts
the premise that the law should impose liability in order to deter
parties from bypassing voluntary market transactions—or, in more
common parlance, contracts.95 The imposition of liability for nega-
tive externalities does exactly that: it forces potential harm-doers to
reach out to potential victims and negotiate consensual transactions
with them. The imposition of a duty of restitution for intentionally
conferred benefits would induce some potential “do-gooders” to
bypass the market, perform unrequested “acts of kindness,” and
then seek to collect for them. Hence, the law should not recognize a
duty to collect in cases of intentional positive externalities. 
A second distinction between negative and positive externalities
focuses on evidence. Here, Dari-Mattiacci argues that the legal
system can more easily handle cases of negative externalities
because victims who sue to recover for harms they have suffered
from negative externalities, such as torts, have an inherent
incentive to adduce evidence relating to their harm.96 In cases of
positive externalities, by contrast, beneficiaries have an inherent
incentive to conceal evidence pertaining to the actual receipt of a
benefit and its magnitude.97
A third, and final, distinction Dari-Mattiacci proposes concerns
the cost to the adjudicative system.98 In the case of negative exter-
nalities, the legal system can simply set a behavior standard—for
example, negligence—and thereafter do nothing.99 This is because
Dari-Mattiacci assumes—following the standard tort model of John
Brown100 and Steven Shavell101—that the standard of care will never
93. Id. at 31-33.
94. Id. at 32-33.
95. See id. at 32.
96. See id. at 41.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 46-49.
99. See id. at 25.
100. See generally John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973).
101. See generally Shavell, supra note 48.
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be violated. That is, injurers, being rational, will adjust their
behavior to the standard and will never act in a negligent fashion.102
Accordingly, the need to enforce the standard will never arise. The
cost of dealing with positive externalities is much higher. If the law
were to award a subsidy to benefactors in cases of positive externali-
ties, the subsidy would be paid repeatedly—each time a benefactor
could prove that she met the legal standard for receiving it.
Dari-Mattiacci’s framework is cogent and illuminating, yet there
are several problems with it. We begin with his distinction between
intentional and unintentional conferrals of benefits. From an
economic standpoint, intent should not be the decisive criterion for
awarding restitution. Rather, the level of transaction costs should
be the measure. This point can be traced back to Guido Calabresi
and Douglas Melamed’s classic article on which Dari-Mattiacci
relies.103 As Calabresi and Melamed famously observed, when
transaction costs are sufficiently low, actors ought to rely on volun-
tary market transactions, and lawmakers should deter attempts to
circumvent the market.104 When transaction costs are prohibitively
high, it is no longer possible to channel transactions through the
market, and it makes sense to allow people to act and compensate
affected parties after the fact.105 In Calabresi-Melamedian terms,
this is a switch from property rule protection—under which the
entitlement holder sets the price of any use or taking of her enti-
tlement106—to liability rule protection—a legal regime that empow-
ers a third party, such as a court or a regulator, to determine the
price for using others’ entitlements after the fact.107 Hence, in high
transaction cost environments, benefactors should be entitled, in
principle, to restitution even in the case of intentional benefits.
Another problem with intent-based rules is that they can be
easily manipulated. Potential benefactors, aware of the legal rules
that entitle them to compensation only in cases of unintentional
102. For an explanation of why rational actors will almost always find it cheaper to comply
with the standard of care in a negligence regime, see, for example, STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 177-206 (2004).
103. See Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 92, at 32-33.
104. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 32, at 1092 & n.7.
105. See id. at 1106-10.
106. Id. at 1092. 
107. See id.
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conferral of benefits, will invariably try to argue that their actions
were unintentional. Relatedly, the proposed distinction will be
difficult to operationalize in practice. There may be cases of mixed
motives, as well as cases in which a benefactor intended to confer a
benefit on some recipients but not on others. At the end of the day,
therefore, adoption of the proposed distinction may lead to pro-
longed litigation.
As for Dari-Mattiacci’s evidence-based distinction between nega-
tive and positive externalities, it proves too much and too little at
the same time. Actually, both negative and positive externalities
raise evidentiary challenges, and these challenges are more sym-
metrical than Dari-Mattiacci’s analysis suggests. Consider first the
challenge of identifying the target group—victims in the case of
negative externalities and beneficiaries in the case of positive ones.
Dari-Mattiacci is absolutely correct that direct victims of negative
externalities have an inherent incentive to identify themselves and
seek recovery.108 No such incentive exists for beneficiaries of positive
externalities. Yet, it is not too difficult to identify the direct ben-
eficiaries of positive externalities. Objective measures such as
increase in property values can aid us in this quest. As for indirect
beneficiaries, admittedly, they will be difficult to identify. But the
same is true of indirect, or nonimmediate victims of negative exter-
nalities, especially large-scale ones. Industrial pollution is a case in
point. Many of the victims of industrial pollution are not readily
discernible, and often they do not even know that they have been
victimized, let alone by whom. 
The difficulty of assessing the harm or benefit remains. Dari-
Mattiacci suggests that in the case of negative externalities, victims
can be relied on to adduce reliable evidence concerning the magni-
tude of their harm, whereas in the case of positive externalities,
beneficiaries have no such incentive.109 We beg to differ. In both
cases, litigants—both plaintiffs and defendants—have an incentive
to misrepresent the evidence. Plaintiffs who incurred a harm re-
sulting from a negative externality have a built-in incentive to over-
state their harm in order to recover a greater amount. Beneficiaries
108. See Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 92, at 25.
109. Id.
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from positive externalities have an incentive to understate the
benefit they received in order to pay less. The legal process deals
with both challenges by relying on experts and other objective
criteria such as market prices and other indexes. In the final anal-
ysis, therefore, Dari-Mattiacci’s evidence-based account, although
relevant and important, does not provide a satisfactory justification
for ignoring positive externalities. 
This leaves us with Dari-Mattiacci’s final point about the cost
advantage of internalizing negative externalities. Evidently, the
argument in its strongest form does not hold water. Court dockets
are brimming with negligence cases and there is no shortage of
cases in which defendants are found negligent and ordered to pay
their victims. Hence, merely setting the legal standard cannot
reliably stem the problem of negative externalities.110 But even if
Dari-Mattiacci were right, his argument would fall short of justify-
ing the current stance of the law on the issue of positive externali-
ties. Both liability regimes and restitution regimes share the same
goal: they aim to guide behavior. Lawmakers should provide actors
with the right set of incentives to engage not only in activities that
do not harm others but also in activities that benefit others.
Liability regimes achieve the former goal. Currently, no adequate
legal framework exists to ensure the latter. Of course, cost is an
important factor in any legal scheme, but it is not a goal in and of
itself. In the final analysis, therefore, from an economic standpoint,
both negative and positive externalities should be internalized
whenever the benefit from externalization exceeds the cost.111 
110. See SHAVELL, supra note 102, at 224-30 (describing problems in the determination of
negligence and the implication thereof); Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent?
Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 NW. U. L.
REV. 293, 293 (1988) (describing the explosion of medical malpractice cases).
111. A recent contribution by Oren Bar-Gill and Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Consent and
Exchange, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 375 (2010), offers a somewhat different take on these issues,
from an ex ante contractual perspective. They assume a model in which “sellers” can offer a
product to “buyers.” Under a rule that allows capture of benefits, sellers can force buyers to
pay for the product they receive. But what is the appropriate price? The parties know the
quality of the goods involved in a transaction, but courts are assumed to be unable to
determine the quality and are limited to knowledge of the average quality of all goods sold.
This has two effects: First, it encourages low-quality sellers to enter and force buyers to “buy.”
Second, it encourages avoidance behavior by low-valuing buyers. Fearing they will be forced
to buy from a low-quality seller, for a negative-value transaction, low-value buyers will be
discouraged from participating in the market at all, even though without a restitution rule,
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In sum, regardless of whether there are suitable private law
mechanisms for internalizing positive externalities, the efficiency
case for doing so seems compelling. We conclude that private law
remedies for recouping benefits conveyed are highly limited; more-
over, whether or not there should be more scope for such private law
solutions to the positive externalities problem, they do not currently
exist. Thus, in the urban development context, positive externalities
can be internalized only via some mechanism that lies outside of the
common law. This insight motivates the discussion that follows.
II. OF CITIES, SHOPPING MALLS, AND EXTERNALITIES
Building on the theoretical discussion in Part I, in this Part we
present the economic literature on cities and shopping malls. By
contrast with their neglected role in legal scholarship, positive
externalities hold pride of place both in urban economics writ large
and in the much smaller body of economic writings on shopping
malls. 
Urban economists believe that positive spillovers are key deter-
minants of the success of cities: spillovers—especially, but not
limited to, those arising from human capital or expertise—account
for the very existence of dense urban areas.112 Following Alfred
Marshall, economists have identified agglomeration effects—posi-
they would have been willing to buy from many sellers. See id. at 375-80. In the extreme case
in which courts base their valuations not on the full range of buyers, but only on the subset
who actually enter the market, the restitution rule may create a reverse lemons problem. See
generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (explaining that uncertainty in individual transactions
can drive the price down for entire markets). The reverse lemons problem can cause the
market to unravel altogether: as low-valuing buyers drop out, the average value of the
remaining buyers increases, making the market less attractive to buyers—and more
attractive to low-quality sellers—in a vicious circle of adverse selection. See Bar-Gill &
Bebchuk, supra, at 379 (referencing, but distinguishing, Akerlof ’s lemons market).
One problem with the Bar-Gill-Bebchuk model is that it assumes away any litigation costs;
such costs will certainly deter many benefit-providers from seeking restitution by eating into
the gains from successful litigation in many cases. Nor is it obvious that valuing benefits is
more difficult than valuing losses, a problem that tort law confronts in every lawsuit.
Moreover, even if Bar-Gill and Bebchuk are right that private law should not offer a remedy
for deliberate conferral of benefits, this does not mean that no such remedy for positive
spillovers should ever exist. 
112. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL.
ECON. 483, 486-87 (1991).
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tive spillovers arising from spatial proximity—as a key variable
affecting economic growth.113 The economic literature on shopping
malls also positions positive spillovers among stores at the heart of
the analysis.114 However, as Peter Pashigian and his coauthors
demonstrate, malls are specifically designed to capture positive
externalities, and it is the ability of developers to internalize them
that determines the performance of shopping malls.115 Combining
the two literatures points to the conclusion that cities should borrow
a page from shopping mall developers’ book in designing commercial
areas. 
A. The Economics of Cities
Although property theory and law undervalue positive externali-
ties, the same cannot be said for leading theories of economic
geography, according to which positive externalities are crucial to
the very existence of cities. Such externalities can take many forms,
but their existence is a necessary condition for agglomeration of
economic activity. 
Paul Krugman received the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economics in
part for his work in economic geography, which offers an expla-
nation for the growth of cities.116 Positive externalities are a key to
this work. The prize committee summarized Krugman’s contribution
by noting that “[t]he new economic geography initiated by Krugman
broke with ... tradition by assuming internal economies of scale and
imperfect competition. Agglomeration is then driven by [positive]
pecuniary externalities mediated through market prices[,] as a
large market allows greater product variety and lower costs.”117
113. See id. at 484-85.
114. See Eric D. Gould et al., Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping Malls,
87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 411, 411-12 (2005); Peter Pashigian & Eric D. Gould, Internalizing
Externalities: The Pricing of Space in Shopping Malls, 41 J.L. & ECON. 115, 140-41 (1998).
115. See Gould et al., supra note 114, at 421.
116. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2008 Awarded to Paul Krugman (Oct. 13, 2008),
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2008/press.html.
117. PRIZE COMM. ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCIS., TRADE AND GEOGRAPHY—ECONOMIES OF
SCALE, DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS AND TRANSPORT COSTS 12 (2008), available at
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes /economics /laureates /2008/advanced-
economicsciences2008.pdf; see also Krugman, supra note 112, at 484-85.
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Krugman’s model starts from the assumption that “consumers have
a taste for variety.”118 That taste can be satisfied either by local
production or by goods brought in from somewhere else, although
the latter are more expensive due to transportation costs.119 Some
goods will be too expensive to import but can be produced locally. As
there are some fixed costs in production, however, there are econ-
omies of scale—larger markets will be able to produce goods at a
lower unit cost than smaller ones.120 Moreover, larger markets will
also tend to have more goods, and hence, a greater variety, than
smaller ones.121 Given that consumers desire additional variety, the
greater range of goods, in combination with cheaper prices, gives
cities an advantage in attracting residents.122 Importantly, that
advantage gets larger as the city grows in size; there are increasing
returns to scale, so growth in size begets further growth.123
Tests of the Krugman model have proven difficult, in part because
of problems with measuring the prices of relevant goods across cities
with sufficient precision. However, a recent paper by Jessie
Handbury and David Weinstein provides empirical support for
Krugman’s theory.124 The paper aggregates tens of millions of
precise observations on prices across cities—prices for “identical
products sold in the same store chain [and purchased] by the same
type of shopper”125—and concludes that with appropriate controls,
the prices of identical goods do indeed fall with an increase in city
size. Conversely, the variety of traded goods increases.126 
118. PRIZE COMM. ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 117, at 4. 
119. See id. at 8.
120. See id. at 14.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Jessie Handbury & David E. Weinstein, Is New Economic Geography Right? Evidence
from Price Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17067, 2011), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17067. 
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id. at 4. They find that:
[R]esidents of New York (population 9.3 million) can choose between 97,000
different types of groceries, whereas residents of Des Moines (population
456,000) only have access to 32,000 varieties. This greater availability of
varieties in larger cities means that variety-adjusted costs [the key drivers of
scale advantage in Krugman’s model] are likely to be substantially lower in
large cities.
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Empirical work by Joel Waldfogel is also supportive of these
general patterns, although not necessarily of Krugman’s precise
model.127 For example, Waldfogel shows that because of high fixed
costs, larger cities can support more radio stations and offer more
programming variety than smaller ones.128 When people differ in
their tastes in music, as Waldfogel shows to be the case for various
racial groups,129 significant positive externalities arise from being
located near others who share one’s preferences.130 Black radio
listeners get access to significantly more variety in the kind of music
they prefer when they live in cities with large black populations as
opposed to those with small black populations.131 In general, “people
get what they want only if [they are located near] others [who] are
also prepared to pay for it. As a result, consumers benefit from
participating in a product market with others who share their pref-
erences.”132 Waldfogel terms this effect a “preference externality.”133
Krugman’s elegant mechanism is far from the only one that
invokes positive externalities to explain why people bunch together
in cities. Rather than focusing on the consumption externalities
Krugman stresses, other theorists have focused on externalities in
the production of goods and services. More than one hundred years
ago, the English economist Alfred Marshall proposed that new ideas
diffused more rapidly when firms are located in physical proximity
to one another, because employees can easily move between em-
ployers or otherwise exchange ideas.134 That, in turn, means that
Id.
127. For an accessible summary and introduction, see generally JOEL WALDFOGEL, THE
TYRANNY OF THE MARKET (2007). 
128. Id. at 43-44.
129. See id. at 46-49.
130. See id. at 51.
131. Id. at 49-50.
132. Id. at 51.
133. Joel Waldfogel, Preference Externalities: An Empirical Study of Who Benefits Whom
in Differentiated-Product Markets, 34 RAND J. ECON. 557, 557 (2003).
134. Marshall wrote that:
[w]hen an industry has ... chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there
long: so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade
get from near neighbourhood to one another. The mysteries of the trade become
no mysteries; but are as it were in the air, and children learn many of them
unconsciously. Good work is rightly appreciated, inventions and improvements
in machinery, in processes and the general organization of the business have
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firms in the same industry benefit from colocation because their
presence lowers information costs for the group as a whole.135 
Whatever their source, some sort of positive spillovers are at the
heart of economic theories of why cities exist in the first place.
Without such benefits to colocation, we would expect economic
activity to be randomly dispersed across the landscape. Instead,
however, at “the end of 2008, one-half of the world [population] ...
live[d] in cities.”136
It is important to note that agglomeration effects—whether in
consumption or production—are different from the positive exter-
nalities we have discussed so far. In garden variety positive exter-
nalities, a firm or consumer provides benefits for others who are
located nearby, without being able to capture any of these benefits
for itself. When Amy cultivates a beautiful garden, for example, she
provides an uncompensated benefit to passersby, but—crucially
—receives no symmetric benefit from their presence as viewers of
her garden. In the case of agglomeration effects, however, the
spillover benefits are mutual: by colocating, each firm provides—but
also receives—benefits from all others situated nearby.137 Thus,
agglomeration effects are dynamically reinforcing: the larger the
population, the greater the effects, and the more attractive it
becomes for a firm or consumer to locate near others.138 No such
mechanism is at work in standard positive externalities.
their merits promptly discussed: if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by
others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the
source of further new ideas. And presently subsidiary trades grow up in the
neighbourhood, supplying it with implements and materials, organizing its
traffic, and in many ways conducing to the economy of its material.
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 271 (8th ed. 1920).
135. In their work, Adam B. Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg, and Rebecca Henderson,
Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations, 108 Q.J.
ECON. 577 (1993), measure geographic spillovers using the relationship between the location
of an original patent and the location of a subsequent patent that cites the original. Their
careful empirical analysis concludes that “there is a clear pattern of localization [of patent
citations] at the country, state, and SMSA levels. Citations are ... two to six times as likely
... to come from the same SMSA as control patents.” Id. at 591. They are “roughly twice as
likely to come from the same state as the originating patent.” Id. The authors interpret this
as evidence of local spillovers of knowledge accumulation. Id.
136. Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction to AGGLOMERATION ECONOMICS 1, 1 (Edward L.
Glaeser ed., 2010) (discussing former population projections prior to 2008). 
137. See Schleicher, supra note 3, at 1519.
138. See id.
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B. The Economics of Shopping Malls
The economic literature on shopping malls is also centered on
positive externalities. Here, however, the story takes an interesting
turn. Unlike cities that evolved organically over a long period of
time and have been shaped by multiple forces and pressures,
shopping malls grow out of careful and discrete planning.139
Moreover, they are designed with one goal in mind: commercial
success.140 Finally, whereas the composition of stores in a particular
mall changes over time, the overall layout and combination remain
fairly constant.141 As a result, shopping mall owners must be very
circumspect about selecting the optimal mix of stores; one means by
which they do so is to adopt a pricing mechanism that enables them
to take account of the relative contribution of each business to other
stores. The use of differential rents—which often diverge signifi-
cantly—allows mall owners to attract businesses of all sizes and
come up with a mix of stores to make the enterprise attractive to
both businesses and patrons.142
Here is an example that illustrates the basic economics of mall
development. Shoelace Shack (Shack) is a small retailer that, unsur-
prisingly, sells shoelaces. In deciding whether to make a purchase
at Shack, its customers have to factor in two separate but related
kinds of costs. The first is the cost of the shoelaces themselves. But
in addition, because customers live at varying distances from Shack,
and transportation is costly, customers must also take account of
their travel costs, in terms of both time and money. Assuming that
all customers have identical tastes for shoelaces, this means that
there is some maximal distance a customer is willing to travel to
purchase his shoelaces from Shack. Beyond that distance, the costs
of travel outweigh the utility gained from buying shoelaces, making
139. See Gould et al., supra note 114, at 421.
140. See Pashigian & Gould, supra note 114, at 117.
141. See Charles C. Carter & Kerry D. Vandell, Store Location in Shopping Centers: Theory
and Estimates, 27 J. REAL EST. RES. 237, 238 (2005).
142. See Pashigian & Gould, supra note 114, at 116-17.
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a visit to Shack uneconomical.143 At any given price for shoelaces,
then, Shack will face a spatially constrained demand.
Imagine that Spears Roadblock (Spears) is a large retailer, selling
clothes, tools, washing machines, TV sets, and so on. Like Shack,
Spears has customers who are spatially dispersed and who must
incur some transportation costs to visit the store. Note, however,
that because Spears sells many big-ticket items, its customers’
willingness to incur transportation costs are larger than Shack’s;
they are willing to drive farther to buy a $750 TV set than the
distance Shack’s customers will drive for a $2.50 pair of shoelaces.
Thus, Spears has a wider catchment area within which it can
attract customers than does Shack.
Consider what will happen if Shack and Spears are located on
immediately adjacent and independently owned plots of land. Some
customers, who would not patronize Shack if it were located by
itself, are willing to drive to Spears. While these customers are at
Spears to buy a TV set, the marginal cost of stopping by Shack to
pick up a pair of shoelaces is essentially zero because they have
already sunk the fixed costs of the trip from their home to Spears,
and all it takes to get to Shack is a walk next door. Shack thus
benefits by being located next to Spears because Spears pulls in
some additional customers for Shack that it could not attract on its
own. Crucially, the relationship is not reciprocal: nobody goes to
Shack to pick up a pair of shoelaces and then decides to buy a TV
set from Spears while they are there. Thus, whereas Shack gains
from being located next to Spears, Spears gets nothing from the
additional customers it generates for Shack. Spears creates a posi-
tive externality, but there is no way it can charge Shack to recover
the benefit of any extra customers it provides: Spears can no more
bill Shack for these additional customers than a homeowner with a
143. See George S. Tolley, The Welfare Economics of City Bigness, 1 J. URB. ECON. 324, 327
(1974) (“In a large city, because of the greater distances to commuting and shopping margins,
land has a greater travel savings value at a given distance from trip destination points than
in a smaller city, making rent plus travel costs higher in the large city.”). This story is taken
from the classic spatial competition model of Harold Hotelling. See generally Harold Hotelling,
Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929). For a model with flexible prices, see generally
C. d’Aspremont et al., On Hotelling’s “Stability in Competition,” 47 ECONOMETRICA 1145
(1979) (discussing this model of competition when prices can be changed).
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nice garden can charge passersby for the views and smells the
garden affords.
An important feature of shopping mall design and management
is the internalization of precisely these externalities. If Shack and
Spears are both located in a mall—with a single owner who charges
rent to both stores—the owner can use the rental rates it charges to
allow Spears to recoup some of the extra business it provides for
Shack.144 The internalization occurs via differential rents charged
by the mall developer: Shack pays a higher rent per square foot to
reflect the fact that it provides essentially no customers for Spears,
whereas Spears pays a lower rent per square foot to reflect the fact
that it draws in additional customers for the other stores located in
the mall. 
The size of these rent discounts are quite substantial, reflecting
the significance of the externalities involved. Peter Pashigian and
his coauthors have found that “[o]n average, anchor stores occupy
over 58% of the total leasable space in the mall and yet pay only
10% of the total rent collected by the developer.”145 Interestingly,
Pashigian and Gould point out that large commercial tenants in
office buildings do not pay lower rents because such tenants provide
no significant externalities for those who locate near them.146
Table 1 demonstrates that anchor stores pay only one-seventh the
rent per square foot, and only about one-quarter the rent per dollar
of sales, as their nonanchor cotenants. Indeed, Gould, Pashigian,
and Prendergast speculate that not only do many anchor stores pay
no rent at all, it may even be the case that some stores actually
receive payments (pay negative net rent) from mall developers.147
144. For providing this service, and others, the mall owner can also earn a profit for herself.
145. Gould et al., supra note 114, at 411.
146. Pashigian & Gould, supra note 114, at 125.
147. However, these stores were not included in the data that the authors analyzed, so the
existence of negative net rent was somewhat speculative. Gould et al., supra note 114, at 413
n.4.
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Table 1: Rent Paid by 2500 Stores in a Sample of 35 Malls148
Anchor Non-Anchor
Ratio:
Anchor/
Non-Anchor
Rent/Sq. Ft $4.13 $29.37 14.1%
Sales/Sq. Ft $185.34 $317.68 58.3%
Rent/$ Sales $0.022 $0.092 24.1%148
Gould, Pashigian, and Prendergast use their data to estimate the
externality generated by an average anchor store in their sample.
They find that the average anchor generates about $60 million in
additional sales for its nonanchor neighbors.149 This, in turn, creates
about $3.9 million in additional rents for the mall developer, but
most of this, about $2.6 million or 66 percent, is returned to the
anchor via lower rent.150
The key takeaway from all of this is that the Spearses of the
world are more profitable when they can take advantage of the
spillover benefits they create for nearby complimentary sellers. A
single owner of a common asset who sets rents so as to capture
these spillovers provides the mechanism through which Spears can
recoup some of its beneficial traffic-inducing effects. But unless the
same party owns both Spears and Shack, or controls some asset
common to both, such as land or buildings, Spears cannot recover
any of the benefits it provides its neighbors. Given a choice, then,
between locating in a mall, where it can recover some of its spillover
148. See id. at 412 tbl.1.
149. Id. at 415-16.
150. A puzzle still remains, however. An anchor store sees very little of the total extra sales
it generates; it gets to keep only two-thirds of the extra rent it generates. But something
seems wrong about this: why does the developer not charge the nonanchor stores more
instead, because they seem to be getting $60 million in positive externalities, and keep it or
use it to subsidize the anchor? Or, to put the question differently, why does the anchor store
not insist on getting a share of the surplus it generates for other stores? One possible answer
to the latter question is that anchor stores do not have enough bargaining power to secure a
bigger share. This alone does not explain why developers do not charge higher rent to
nonanchor stores. Hence, the bargaining power explanation ought to be complemented by
another one. One such explanation may be transaction or accounting costs. It may simply be
too expensive to apportion the surplus generated by anchor stores for nonanchor stores with
any degree of precision. 
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benefits, or a city center, Spears has very strong reasons to prefer
the former. 
Besides mapping out the size of the externality created by anchor
stores, Gould, Pashigian, and Prendergast make another fundamen-
tal contribution to the analysis of internalization-by-contract.
Shopping malls create difficult contractual design problems by
virtue of the crosscutting incentives that internalization gener-
ates.151 Gould, Pashigian, and Prendergast show how shopping mall
contracts are carefully written to manage such incentives.152
All the parties involved in a mall want the anchor store to behave
well—that is, to undertake activities such as advertising that are
discretionary but that strengthen the spillover benefits the anchor
creates.153 The parties also want the developer to behave well, by
keeping the mall clean and well maintained, advertising, providing
parking, and so on.154 Providing each actor with incentives to under-
take the right amount of such activities—given that some of the
benefits are captured by others—requires a fairly complex percent-
age rent system. Each store typically has a fixed rent component,
which in some cases entails a zero fixed rent for anchors; a sales
threshold, above which the store owes additional rent; and a per-
centage rate on sales above the threshold.155
Managing all of this is not straightforward: the appropriate
tradeoffs between fixed and percentage rent depend on how sen-
sitive sales are to promotional activities, risk aversion, and a host
of other factors that are subject to business judgment.156 The bottom
line is that running a mall, and setting the percentage rates cor-
rectly, is quite a tricky undertaking. It is probably not the kind of
thing a municipal government would have the skills to handle, even
if it had the inclination. This kind of complexity, then, suggests the
infeasibility of a governmentally run mall. If there are to be urban-
mall equivalents at all, they will probably need to be privately
managed.157 
151. See Gould et al., supra note 114, at 419.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 411.
156. See id. at 411, 420.
157. A cautionary note: positive externalities are frequently extolled as a justification for
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III. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH TO URBAN DEVELOPING
The traditional way of attracting businesses to a locality is to
offer them financial benefits either in the form of direct cash grants
or via various tax breaks.158 Past experience teaches that both of
these approaches typically fail.159 A combination of reasons account
for this result. First, setting subsidies and tax breaks correctly is
very difficult. The least amount a certain business, or industry,
would be willing to accept to operate in a certain location is private
information, known to the business alone.160 Naturally, businesses
have an incentive to overstate their “reservation subsidy” in order
to extract bigger subsidies from municipalities. As a consequence,
municipalities are likely to overpay businesses in order to attract
them to the relevant jurisdiction.161 Second, subsidies and tax
breaks breed corruption. Considering the fact that money used to
attract business comes from the public fisc, rather than from the
politicians’ own pockets, politicians may use it to reward their
supporters in the business community, not the businesses that may
spark economic development in the area.162 Such transfers are not
only unfair, but also ineffective in that they provide an advantage
various kinds of urban planning policies—for example, sports arenas. Yet the research of
Robert Baade and Richard Dye, as well as Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, shows
approximately zero effect on cities that add a sports team or build a sports arena. See Baade
& Dye, supra note 7, at 13; Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 30, at 36. It is important to realize
that a particular mechanism is implicated in the case of shopping malls and that this
mechanism is not necessarily present in many development contexts. In other words, we are
not writing a general brief for cities to “discover” positive externalities from any and all
development projects, many of which lack both an empirical record of producing spillover
benefits and a theoretical rationale.
158. ALAN ALTSHULER & DAVID LUBEROFF, MEGA-PROJECTS: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF
URBAN PUBLIC INVESTMENT 4 (2003); see also id. at 2. A third way was to provide the
infrastructure necessary to attract businesses to the locality. Provision of infrastructure could
either complement subsidies and tax breaks or serve as an independent inducement for
business. See Timothy J. Bartik, Solving the Problems of Economic Development Incentives,
36 GROWTH & CHANGE 139, 140 (2005). 
159. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints
on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 397 (1996).
160. See Mark Taylor, Note, A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72
TEX. L. REV. 669, 688 (1994).
161. See Enrich, supra note 159, at 395.
162. See Taylor, supra note 160, at 685-86.
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to inefficient businesses over more efficient ones.163 Third, and
relatedly, subsidies and tax breaks foment rent seeking and rent
extraction. The prospect of receiving money from the government is
liable to spark fierce competition for rents among business owners
who would expend resources in an attempt to capture the relevant
benefits.164 Politicians, for their part, may also invest time and
money to secure concessions and payments from the businesses
vying for the government money.165 Critically, both rent seeking and
rent extraction are inherently wasteful activities that divert
resources from productive activities to nonproductive ones. Fourth,
subsidies and tax breaks come at the expense of the public. The
money used to finance them might have been invested in other
municipal services that would better serve the public.166 Fifth,
empirical studies have shown that subsidies and tax breaks have
largely failed to produce sustainable economic growth.167 At best,
they have a limited short-term effect that cannot be parlayed into
a long-term one.168
After discussing the shortcomings of the traditional approach, we
propose a different solution that uses public power to construct
appropriately sized asset configurations, but then places them in
private hands to develop.
In the remainder of this Part, we develop a blueprint that may
help revitalize commerce in American cities without relying on
subsidies or tax breaks. To this end, we draw on the insights
discussed so far. Our plan involves two distinct steps. The first step
involves asset configuration, which consists of creating tracts that
are big enough for the creation of commercial districts. The second
step is to create the right mix of stores to attract patrons.
163. See Enrich, supra note 159, at 404.
164. See Taylor, supra note 160, at 688-89. 
165. See id. at 690-91.
166. See Enrich, supra note 159, at 402.
167. See, e.g., Justin Dahlheimer, Years of Subsidizing Retail and Nothing to Show for It,
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.ilsr.org/retail/news/years-
subsidizing-retail-and-nothing-show-it.
168. See id.
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A. Asset Configuration
Naturally, the establishment of commercial districts within a city
requires the city to zone the relevant area for commercial use.169 To
be sure, municipalities have long used their zoning power to this
end.170 But designating areas for a commercial use is the beginning,
rather than the end, of the process. In order to enable the creation
of the right mix of businesses, local lawmakers must ensure the
existence of parcels of various sizes and layouts within the commer-
cial area. For example, the typical parcel necessary for a department
store is very different from that necessary to support a small retail
store, and even within a category of shops there may be different
preferences with respect to size and other asset characteristics. 
Indeed, asset definition, or configuration, is an important dimen-
sion of property law.171 Assets do not remain frozen in time. Rather,
policymakers and owners constantly redefine assets in response to
changes in the real world.172 As Robert Ellickson famously observed,
the specific configuration of an asset depends on the owner’s con-
templated use: 
For example, suppose that the optimal territorial scale of the
Coase College campus, given its educational purposes, is 200
acres. But the optimal scale for exploitation of the oil pool
beneath Coase is 7777 acres. And when Coase rents living space
to a sophomore, an optimal space is ... a 150-square-foot dormi-
tory room.173
As Ellickson’s example illustrates, assets may come in various
sizes and with widely divergent bundles of features. In the case of
land, for example, lot size may predominate over other features. Yet,
even in the case of land, there are other variables that may be
reconfigured. Land may be bundled with structures or environmen-
169. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 938 (7th ed. 2010).
170. See id. at 929 (describing the proliferation of zoning laws in the early 1900s).
171. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 59, at 1015 (naming asset configuration as one
of the three dimensions that defines the scope of property rights).
172. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 169, at 954 (explaining the need for flexibility in
zoning); see also id. at 319-22 (describing different arrangements for concurrently owned
land).
173. Ellickson, supra note 56, at 1332-33.
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tal amenities or may be offered without them. The list of options
with respect to other goods is even greater. Consider the case of
cars. Cars can assume different shapes and incorporate a wide array
of mechanical specifications and safety features. The specific config-
uration is often left to the private owner or manufacturer of the
asset whose primary motivation will be to maximize asset value, but
it may also be dictated by a regulator whose main focus is health
and safety concerns. 
Of course, social preferences also evolve over time, which makes
preexisting configurations, especially in the case of land, outmoded
or suboptimal.174 For instance, the optimal lot size in nineteenth-
century Manhattan was almost certainly very different from what
it is today. Subdivision and partition in kind allow owners to adjust
lot size downward;175 aggregation or land assembly allow for the
opposite dynamic.176 Critically, though, there is a difference between
downward and upward adjustments of lot sizes. As scholars such as
Francesco Parisi, Ben Depoorter, and Michael Heller have noted, it
is much easier to break large parcels down into smaller lots than to
aggregate smaller lots into a single large parcel.177 Although the
literature has primarily focused on fragmentation of property rights,
rather than assets, the problem is essentially the same.178 
174. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 169, at 954.
175. See id. at 338.
176. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465,
1467-68 (2008).
177. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173,
1179 n.82 (1998); Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 613 (2002);
Ben W.F. Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fragmentation of Property Rights: A Functional
Interpretation of the Law of Servitudes pt. III.A.1 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ.,
& Pub. Policy Working Papers, Paper No. 284, 2003), available at http://digitalcommons.law.
yale.edu/lepp_papers/284.
178. The fragmentation literature focuses on the problem of multiple rights holders, each
in possession of a relatively small interest in an asset, typically realty. Fragmentation
typically arises when a single owner transfers her rights to multiple recipients either while
she is alive or at her death. The result is that the underlying asset will be underused since
each recipient, by dint of having a property interest in the asset—albeit a small one—can veto
any use of the asset that she does not like. A similar problem may arise when large assets are
portioned in kind into smaller assets. Post partition, the assets may become too small for
certain uses. In fact, the two problems are even more closely related than it first seems. When
multiple parties own an asset and they cannot agree on how to use it, each of them can bring
an action for partition. A court will then have to decide whether to order partition in kind or
partition by sale. Under current law, the formal default rule is partition in kind. See
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 169, at 338-47 (collecting cases on partition in kind and by
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Aggregation of rights—or “land assembly” as the practice is often
called—can be accomplished either through voluntary market
transactions (contracts) or through forced ones (eminent domain).179
The first method, aggregation through voluntary market transac-
tions, will often fall prey to high transaction costs. As many com-
mentators have noted, serial acquisitions of land parcels invariably
involve lengthy negotiations with the relevant title holders and,
worse, often give rise to serious holdout problems.180 In light of the
fact that the acquirer needs to buy the rights to all relevant parcels,
each of the current owners has veto power over the entire project
and has a built-in incentive to hold out in an attempt to capture the
greatest possible share of the bargaining surplus.181 
The second method, taking by eminent domain, eliminates the
holdout problem that undermines voluntary transactions. Indeed,
Judge Posner posited that holdouts are “[t]he only justification” for
the existence of the power of eminent domain.182 By virtue of this
power, private property is protected vis-à-vis the government by
what Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed termed “liability
rules,”183 meaning that the government can take title to private
property as long as it is willing to pay just compensation to be
determined by a court after the fact184 and satisfies the “public use”
requirement in the Fifth Amendment.185 In more conventional eco-
nomic parlance, the government holds a call option exercisable at
market price on all private property.186 Hence, the holdout problem
does not arise when the government chooses to take property by
eminent domain. 
Some theorists have suggested that the takings power is neces-
sary to address the problem of too many rights holders. We believe,
sale).
179. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 70-71 (8th ed. 2011).
180. See, e.g., id.
181. Id.
182. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 93-94 (2005).
183. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 32, at 1092. 
184. Posner, supra note 182, at 93 (explaining that just compensation is set at market
value, which is often less than the subjective valuation of the original property holder).
185. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005) (defining “public use”
broadly to include economic development).
186. See Posner, supra note 182, at 93.
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however, that it actually addresses the problem of suboptimal
configuration of land parcels. As Abraham Bell, together with one
of us, explained, as far as the power of eminent domain is concerned:
[T]he underlying problem is not necessarily one of too many
owners but rather of suboptimally configured assets. Assume
that the government needs a large tract to construct a military
base. The government would need to resort to land assembly
only if there are not any individual tracts of adequate size. If
there were sufficiently large tracts, fewer holdout problems
would arise, and the government could acquire title to one or
more of the tracts through voluntary negotiations.187
Suboptimal asset configuration is also the main obstacle to
development of vibrant commercial zones in American cities. In
order to carry out our proposal, it is necessary to find tracts of
sufficient size to support comprehensive commercial development.
Alas, it is impossible to find large vacant tracts in most cities.188 In
fact, this is the reason that shopping malls are usually situated in
suburbs. Accordingly, the first step on the way to implementing our
scheme would require localities to use their power of eminent
domain to piece together tracts of suitable size for comprehensive
commercial planning. 
The foregoing analysis would probably change if vertical malls
were to gain popularity in the United States. Vertical malls in
urban areas might permit the same kind of spillover-internalization
that conventional “horizontal” malls offer the suburbs. And since
their footprint is relatively small, vertical malls would not seem to
require extensive aggregation or land assembly.
187. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 59, at 1042. 
188. A few cities do have abundant vacant land. “Urban planners have estimated that
Detroit contains between 30 and 40 square miles of vacant land, [one-fourth to one-third of
the city’s total area].” John Gallagher, Farming Plan Gains Traction in Detroit, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Aug. 20, 2010, at A18; see Detroit (city), Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). But the reason
there is so much vacant land is that the city has already succumbed to economic decline, so
the construction of an urban mall would probably do little to help it. Moreover, although “[t]he
city has a lot of vacant land, ... very few [parcels] are areas of 20 acres or more,” according to
an executive at the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation. Christine MacDonald, Recent City
Relocation Projects Fall Short, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 9, 2011, at A1.
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Although the idea of vertical malls may seem alien to American
consumers and urban planners, such malls are common in major
Asian, European,189 and Latin American cities.190 There are also
some examples of vertical malls in the United States, although they
are relatively few and far between. The first domestic vertical mall
was constructed in Chicago in 1976 as part of Water Tower Place
skyscraper.191 Recently, plans have been made to open another
vertical mall in Los Angeles.192 Although vertical malls are appar-
ently less appealing to consumers because they offer a less conve-
nient and more time consuming shopping experience, land scarcity
may force American consumers to adjust their shopping experience.
Land scarcity is an important determinant of architecture. As land
becomes increasingly in short supply, the optimal configuration of
malls changes too. Increasing traffic congestion and rising gas prices
may expedite the shift from horizontal to vertical malls. 
A shift to vertical shopping malls, if it is to occur, would probably
have little effect on our analysis. In fact, it would make the
implementation of our proposal easier since the amount of land
necessary for the construction of malls would be smaller. This
means that there may be less need for eminent domain exercises in
order to assemble enough tracts to support mall construction.
Indeed, in many cases private developers would conceivably be able
to complete the land assembly phase without government assis-
tance. Even in such cases, however, private developers may need
municipalities to relax zoning restrictions to allow for the construc-
tion of sufficiently tall buildings that can accommodate enough
stores.
189. Roger Vincent, Developers Have High Hopes for Vertical Mall, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2008, at C1.
190. See Mario Castro F., Vertical Shopping Centers in Latin America, ICSC CERTIFIED
PROFS. NEWSL. (Int’l Council of Shopping Ctrs., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 2008, available at
http://www.icsc.org/srch/education/newsletter/CPNews0208/12_VerticalSCs.pdf.
191. Water Tower Place, CHI. ARCHITECTURE INFO, http://www.chicagoarchitecture.info/
Printer.php?ID=1351 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012).
192. Vincent, supra note 189. 
2012] CITIES, PROPERTY, AND POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES 253
B. Arriving at the Right Combination
Once the lots necessary for the establishment of a commercial
area have been assembled, cities will have to tackle the challenge of
creating the right combination of stores to attract patrons. There are
two possible ways to accomplish this task. First, cities can maintain
ownership of the retail spaces and rent them out to commercial
outfits. In this process, cities will be well advised to consult shop-
ping mall planners both about the optimal combination of stores and
about pricing. Second, cities can simply auction off the land to mall
developers and let them decide to whom to rent the space and at
what price. The remainder of this Part discusses the advantages
and disadvantages of each of the options. 
1. Self-Development
The option of self-development may be attractive to cities for
political reasons. Under this option, the city would essentially go
into the mall-management business by designing the mall, supervis-
ing its construction, fixing rents, finding tenants, and so on. This
strategy has both advantages and disadvantages. Politically, it may
be easier to embark upon large-scale condemnations if the lots
remain municipal property. Exercises of eminent domain that are
followed by transfers of rights to private actors can engender
negative political reactions and in some cases result in a backlash,
as the case of Kelo v. City of New London illustrates.193 There, the
city of New London sought to take multiple private lots in order to
facilitate the construction of a new headquarters for Pfizer.194 Even
though the plan passed constitutional muster, it was never carried
out, owing to the harsh public reaction it prompted.195 As a matter
of public perception, exercises of eminent domain in the service of
commercial entities are problematic, presumably because they are
widely perceived as a sharp deviation from principles of equality
and fairness.196
193. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
194. Id. at 473-75.
195. See JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE 376-77 (2009).
196. See id.
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If the government maintains ownership of the taken property in
the aftermath of a taking, the public reaction will likely be much
less negative. Even the staunchest critics of the Supreme Court’s
extant takings jurisprudence agree as a matter of positive law that
when the government maintains an ownership interest in the
condemned property, the taking is legitimate.197 Consequently,
politicians, like all other self-interest maximizers, will be far more
inclined to embark upon projects that do not pose a threat to their
political careers. 
Although retaining ownership over the land seems far more
attractive initially, one must bear in mind that over time the polit-
ical calculus may change. Continuous ownership would subject local
politicians to ongoing scrutiny from the public and local media. Rent
adjustments—especially rent increases—may result in disgruntled
store owners, and in some cases, prolonged legal battles. Finally,
long term management of the commercial space will expose cities to
multiple political pressures from commercial actors seeking favors
and concessions. 
We suspect it is unwise for cities to attempt to develop the
commercial areas by themselves, as they clearly lack the expertise
necessary for the task. The informational obstacle might not be
insurmountable, however, if cities can turn either to current mall
developers or to former employees of such companies for advice on
how to achieve the optimal mix of stores. Indeed, it is even possible
that there are independent experts who sell consulting services to
mall developers and can also assist cities in their quest to achieve
the right combination of stores. As far as pricing is concerned, cities
can once again buy advice from independent companies or mall
developers, or, if they are courageous enough, they can even consult
the economic literature on the subject.198 However, all of these
suggestions entail agency costs, which are likely to be substantial,
precisely because cities lack the knowledge to adequately monitor
the advice and behavior of any experts they hire. For example,
consultants may be tempted to give self-serving advice; and even if
they are honest, hired consultants are not the residual claimants on
profit flows from the project, in the way that mall owners are. Thus,
197. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 517 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. See supra Part II.B. 
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their incentives are not properly aligned to yield efficient advice.
And on the other side, public development and management run the
risk of corruption and featherbedding—for example, packing the
operation with patronage appointments.
2. Auctioning Off the Project
The second option available to cities is to auction off their rights
to the highest bidder and allow the winner to develop the commer-
cial space as she sees fit. We have two principal reasons for our
endorsement of the auction mechanism. First, from an economic
standpoint, a properly administered auction will yield cities the
highest possible payoff for their rights. Secondly, the law of many
jurisdictions mandates the use of auctions by municipalities in
commercial transactions.199 The law’s preference for auctions should
come as no surprise. Economic theory suggests that properly de-
signed auctions can induce bidders to reveal their true valuations,200
as well as maximize the revenues of the seller.201 But perhaps more
importantly, the use of auctions reduces the risk of political favor-
itism that may lead to suboptimal allocation of resources by public
authorities.202 Auctions constrain the ability of public officials to
dole out political favors to their supporters, forcing them, instead,
to focus on the good of the public. Auctioning off the rights to the
taken lots will relieve cities of the need to devise optimal develop-
ment and pricing schemes for the planned commercial area.
Furthermore, some of the proceeds of the auction may be used for
compensating the previous owners of the lots, and the remainder
may be used to finance other public projects. Finally, parting
199. 10 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29:80 (3d ed. 2009)
(“[C]harter provisions that certain contracts of municipal corporations be awarded to the
lowest and best, or lowest responsible, bidder are made for the protection of public interests
and must be complied with by the municipal authorities for the benefit of the public.”).
200. Jason F. Shogren et al., Bid Sensitivity and the Structure of the Vickrey Auction, 76
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1089, 1089 (1994) (describing auctions as a standard valuation for
nonmarket goods).
201. Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, 6 MATHEMATICS OPERATIONS RES. 58, 72
(1981) (investigating a variety of auctions to maximize seller value).
202. See CHARLES W. SMITH, AUCTIONS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VALUE (1990)
(arguing that auctions are often used when parties to a transaction need to assure the public
that a price has been arrived at in a fair and legitimate manner). 
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company with the rights will stem political pressures from various
interest and lobby groups who can potentially benefit from the
project. 
At this point, one may wonder whether cities may use their
eminent domain power to acquire rights to land and then proceed to
transfer the rights to private developers without violating the public
use requirement of the Constitution.203 The answer is clearly “yes.”
The Supreme Court has construed the public use requirement very
broadly. In Berman v. Parker, the Court upheld a large-scale urban
renewal plan in Washington, D.C. that required condemnation and
transfer of multiple private lots to private developers.204 The Court
explained that the public use prong is met whenever the govern-
ment acts within its police power205 and that “[t]he role of the
judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for
a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”206 
Since Berman, the Court has adhered steadfastly to this position.
For example, thirty years later, in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, the Court sanctioned Hawaii’s Land Reform Act of 1967,
which empowered tenants to force their landlords to relinquish their
fee simple interest in the property and transfer it to the tenants.207
A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the Hawaii legislation, pro-
nouncing that the Public Use Clause is coterminous with police
power.208 And, of course, in Kelo, the Supreme Court approved a
planned taking of numerous private properties by the city of New
London in order to free up land for the construction of an industrial
park for Pfizer.209 The taking was justified on the ground that it was
necessary for the economic development of the area.210 Granted, the
decision has sparked a hailstorm of public criticism.211 Lost in the
203. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1412, 1413-15 (2006) (surveying the critical responses to the Kelo decision).
204. 348 U.S. 26, 28-31, 36 (1954).
205. Id. at 32. The Court elucidated that “[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and
quiet, law and order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional
application of the police power to municipal affairs.” Id.
206. Id.
207. 467 U.S. 229, 231-33 (1984).
208. Id. at 240.
209. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473-75, 490 (2005).
210. Id. at 483-84.
211. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN.
L. REV. 2100, 2101-02 (2009).
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storm was the fact that the decision “broke no new legal ground;” it
was perfectly consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in
this area.212 
Subsequent decisions that upheld economic development were
met with relative equanimity. In Goldstein v. New York State Urban
Development Corp., the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
taking of multiple private lots in Brooklyn in order to transfer them
to a private developer for the purpose of building a basketball
arena.213 Naturally, the case had its critics,214 but the overall reac-
tion was a far cry from the reaction to Kelo. Finally, in Kaur v. New
York State Urban Development Corp., the New York Court of
Appeals had little problem ruling that a taking designed to transfer
land to Columbia University passed state constitutional muster.215
In light of judicial precedent, the public use requirement will not
present a serious legal hurdle to the implementation of our pro-
posal. 
At the end of the day, the choice between self-development and
outsourcing depends on a host of variables that are likely to vary
from one locality to another. The first variable is the attitude of the
local population to exercises of the takings power designed to
acquire rights for private entities. If the population is strongly
opposed to the practice, auctioning off the rights is not a real option.
The second variable is the planning horizons of local politicians and
their attitudes toward risk. Politicians who are focused on the short
term and are mildly risk averse will likely prefer to sell the rights
to developers and receive a large one-time payment in exchange for
the prospect of maintaining ownership and dealing with the
potential pitfalls and uncertainty associated with managing the
property. Finally, budgetary considerations may tip the scale in
favor of outsourcing. Cities in need of an immediate infusion of
money will clearly choose to auction off their rights and use the
proceeds to balance their budget, rather than wait a long time to see
how the development stage pans out. 
212. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 203, at 1413.
213. 921 N.E.2d 164, 165-66 (N.Y. 2009).
214. See Ilya Somin, Let There Be Blight: Blight Condemnations in New York After
Goldstein and Kaur, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1193, 1200-09 (2011); Ilya Somin, The Judicial
Reaction to Kelo, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 15-18 (2011).
215. 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010).
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IV. THE UNDERAPPRECIATED WELFARE EFFECTS OF OUR PROPOSAL
Moving stores to the city is obviously something that cities desire,
and it is defensible purely on that basis. By increasing the tax base,
generating jobs, and attracting foot traffic that makes streets safer,
bringing in large stores can create obvious benefits for a city. But
from a bird’s eye, social welfare perspective, isn’t the relocation of
a large store from suburb Y to the center of city X subject to the
classic zero-sum critique that the city’s gain is just equal to the
suburb’s loss, with no net improvement in social welfare? The
answer is clearly “no,” because there are unpriced negative exter-
nalities associated with the low-density living in suburbs. Reducing
these negative externalities would produce a net social gain.
Consequently, moving stores from suburbs to cities is not just
redistributive, but also has positive effects on overall welfare.
The economists Edward Glaeser216 and Matthew Kahn217 make a
compelling empirical and theoretical case that low-density living
raises transportation costs for both people and goods, increases
energy consumption and pollution, and raises building costs.218
Take pollution, for example. Lower density invariably entails less
walking, more driving, and greater use of private rather than public
transportation. Additionally, energy-efficient public transportation
is less economical when the population is widely dispersed.219
Although the negative effects of these pollution-generating activities
could, in theory, be corrected by appropriate Pigouvian taxes of the
type described earlier, in practice, we do not currently employ such
corrective mechanisms.220 As a result, suburban/dispersed living
216. Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew E. Kahn, The Greenness of Cities: Carbon Dioxide
Emissions and Urban Development, 67 J. URB. ECON. 404 (2010); Edward L. Glaeser &
Matthew E. Kahn, Sprawl and Urban Growth 31-41 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9733, 2003) [hereinafter Glaeser & Kahn, Sprawl], available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9733. 
217. KAHN, supra note 27.
218. See Reid Ewing, Is Los Angeles-Style Sprawl Desirable?, 63 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 107
(1997) (suggesting that the answer to this question is also “no,” and making a persuasive case
against sprawl); Peter Gordon & Harry W. Richardson, Are Compact Cities a Desirable Goal?,
63 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 96 (1997) (suggesting that the answer is “no”).
219. See Glaeser & Kahn, Sprawl, supra note 216, at 40.
220. Indeed, free roads and highways are effective subsidies to automobile ownership.
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generates negative externalities, and these would be reduced by
encouraging greater density.
One might think that some of Kahn’s and Glaeser’s arguments for
the relative “greenness” of cities do not actually entail externalities.
For example, transportation costs are presumably priced into the
products people buy and might also be capitalized into home prices.
Higher building costs and heating expenses are surely passed on to
consumers of housing. When the prices of goods or assets reflect the
appropriate social costs of the resources associated with producing
and consuming them, no externalities will exist. Alas, however,
home and product prices do not fully reflect the costs of urban
sprawl. True, the buyer of a suburban home pays for the higher
energy costs used to heat and cool it. But the additional energy used
does not incorporate the additional pollution costs, so the suburban
resident pays for only a part of the resources her lifestyle uses up.
Similarly, prices may reflect higher transportation costs but not the
costs of the additional pollution or congestion that the transporta-
tion entails. This is the second-best justification for reducing sprawl
at the margin by encouraging large stores to move downtown.
All this means that the standard “revealed preference” argu-
ment221—people live in suburbs, thus they prefer them, and living
there is efficient—is likely to be wrong. A combination of market,
governmental, and legal failures is associated with sprawling cities.
Market failures such as unpriced pollution mean that prices do not
reflect the true economic costs of low-density living. Governmental
failures such as overly restrictive building codes and zoning
requirements also contribute to the problem.222 And the legal system
also plays a role because the law impedes the realization of
appropriately sized land parcels.223 Under such conditions, the
choices people make about where to live cannot be welfare-optimal
because they are based on a whole variety of mispriced resources. 
221. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 932
(1996).
222. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Zoning on Housing
Affordability (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8835, 2002), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8835.pdf.
223. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 59, at 1033-42 (explaining how property regimes
may set inefficient asset configurations); Heller & Hills, supra note 176, at 1472-82
(describing challenges with private and public land assembly). 
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Although correcting all these failures would be even better than
inducing large stores to move to city centers, substantial policy
changes such as increases in gasoline taxes and cap-and-trade
programs for carbon emissions are politically fraught. Moreover,
many such policy prescriptions are available only at a national level.
Our more modest proposal, by contrast, is less likely to run into
political obstacles and can be enacted by any city on its own.
CONCLUSION
In this Article we have proposed a new way of creating better
planned commercial districts that may help attract consumers to
American downtowns. The mechanism we advance is designed to
create a higher volume and more attractive mix of stores by
allowing for internalization of positive externalities among retailers.
Attracting consumers back to city centers also has the potential to
reduce the negative externalities associated with urban sprawl and
enhance agglomeration effects within cities. However, we would like
to end this Article on a cautionary note. Our proposal should not be
thought of as a foolproof recipe for rekindling economic growth in
urban spaces. Mario Palèse correctly notes that “[c]ities, like people,
are too diverse to allow anything but fairly commonsense prescrip-
tions. A lot of grand theories have been advanced—targeted tax
incentives! bike paths!—but they have proven of little practical
use.”224 He further points out that “[t]he history of local economic
development is a story of academic fads.”225 In the 1960s, the
prevalent philosophy among academics was that it was imperative
to attract strategic industry to cities via various financial incentives
and investment in infrastructure.226 Then high-tech industrial parks
became trendy among academics, and municipalities were called
upon to build them and offer perks to high-tech companies in order
lure them in.227 The 1980s saw the coming of “industrial clusters.”
The harbinger of this new trend was Professor Michael Porter of the
224. Mario Polèse, Urban-Development Legends, CITY J., Autumn 2011, at 115, available
at http://www.city-journal.org/2011/21_4_urban-development.html. 
225. Id. 
226. Id.
227. Id.
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Harvard Business School.228 The 1980s were also the heyday of the
idea of “community economic development,” which led to the
establishment and financing of copious local business-development
corporations.229 All these ideas yielded mixed results—some of the
localities in which they were implemented achieved long-term
economic success; many others did not.230
If history is to teach us something, it is that urban development
should be approached with a healthy dose of modesty. This may be
the main virtue of our proposal. We would like readers to think of
our idea as a mere component of a more general urban policy
intended to spark economic growth. The main advantages of our
proposal over past schemes lie in its low cost and its reversibility.
Unlike the more ambitious plans of the past, it requires only modest
expenditures on planning and land assembly, and does not involve
the risk that large expanses of land will go to waste or lie fallow
should the plan fail. Commercial districts are already in existence
in all American cities. We merely propose a way to improve them.
In the case of failure, new stores will replace existing ones, as would
happen in any normal business cycle. Hence, the risk associated
with our plan is relatively low. The upside of our proposal, on the
other hand, could prove quite significant. 
228. Id. at 115-16.
229. Id. at 116.
230. See id. at 117-19.
